

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AS IMPETUS TO FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract: *Current paper is dedicated to the study of diverse theoretical aspects connected with motives for constitutional modifications behind states' behavior, evaluations of countries' development strategies in terms of consecutive reforms considered necessary at certain node of political changes and outputs, factors shaping critical (scholarly) debates over the essentials of preferred development models, influence of countries' comparative strategic advantages to foreign political choices and actions.*

Keywords: *constitutional changes, development agenda, political modernization, globalization, development paradigm, strategic foreign policy tasks, cooperation, Uzbekistan.*

The constitutional reforms in Uzbekistan have become an extension of the political course featured in the Development Strategy for 2022-2026. Actors of diverse societal levels and spheres could be able to take part in the discussion of the upcoming legal changes, argue for certain norms and provisions. These discussions and expressions over the draft of the updating Constitution were supposed to demonstrate the degree of political participation and civil activism, to map the political culture¹ of and legal consciousness in the society.

The contemporary world lives the conditions of (i) non-linear spontaneous shifts, (ii) socio-cultural transformations that may vary in their directions, depth and speed, (iii) growing trans-border (transboundary) conflicts, (iv) permanent long-term tensions in world politics, and as a result, asymmetry of power and (v) “reconfiguring” of the world order.

The logic of the current stage of the country's socio-economic development, and simultaneously, radical changes in external environment both at the regional and global levels, stimulate internal changes and the mobilization of political, economic, social and cognitive resources.

The boundary spanning between intra-societal and extra-societal environment, ‘inseparability’ of domestic and foreign policies, the interdependence that has intensified during the Covid-19, the very specifics of

¹ More common understanding of political culture: ‘political beliefs, actions, shared patterns of political orientations’.

Uzbekistan's geography, its location in the center of Central Asia and on crossroad of strategic transport routes, but at the same time, the reality of 'geographical/territorial trap' (double landlocked country), and as a result, other costs, definitely impose their own rules.

In this context, constitutional changes as a resource for renewal are largely believed to give an institutional and intellectual impetus to the growth of Uzbekistan's strategic capabilities and opportunities.

To comprehend motives for constitutional modifications behind states' behavior and development strategies, we chose to focus on some postulates of 'theory of constitutional amendment'. One of key scholars in/of referred theory, Donald S. Lutz put forward three main assumptions to better understand "the empirical patterns that result from constitutional choice": (i) "Every political system needs to be modified over time as a result of some combination of (1) changes in the environment within which the political system operates (including economics, technology, foreign relations, demographics, etc.); (2) changes in the value system distributed across the population; (3) unwanted or unexpected institutional effects; and (4) the cumulative effect of decisions made by the legislature, executive, and judiciary"; (ii) "In political systems that are constitutional, in which constitutions are taken seriously as limiting government and legitimating the decision-making process they describe, important modifications in the operation of the political system need to be reflected in the constitution"; (iii) "All constitutions require regular, periodic modification, whether through amendment, judicial or legislative alteration, or replacement"².

Following the research, conducting by the Comparative Constitutions Project, it is observed, that among the countries of *Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada*, new constitutions were adopted by Finland and Switzerland in 1999; *Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet countries* – new constitutions (after 2000) were adopted by Hungary in 2011, Kyrgyzstan in 2006 and 2007, Turkmenistan in 2008, Montenegro in 2007, Serbia in 2006; *countries of Latin America and the Caribbean* – the Dominican Republic in 2002, 2010, 2015, Bolivia in 2009, Ecuador in 2008; *Middle East and North Africa* – Algeria in 2020, Yemen in 2015, Egypt in 2014, Tunisia in 2014, Syria in 2012, Morocco in 2011, Iraq in

² Lutz S. D. Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment // The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), 355-370. – P. 357. – URL: http://econweb.umd.edu/~wallis/398W/lutz_amendment_APSR_1994.pdf

2005, Qatar for the first time in 2003, Bahrain in 2002; *countries of South Asia* – Nepal in 2015, Bhutan in 2008, Maldives in 2008, Pakistan in 2002; *countries of East Asia* – Thailand in 2007 and 2017, Myanmar in 2007, East Timor in 2002. Among the countries with the highest rate of adopted amendments, Project's visualized data³ refers to Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Norway, Germany, Great Britain, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Israel, India, Singapore, Malaysia, and New Zealand⁴.

Ascertaining the diverse approaches to adopting amendments or even updating constitutions, political and legal scholars considered in the case of above mentioned countries, that they have already completed the construction and presently are practicing, or on their way to transit to or assemble such modern democracies as 'consensus', 'deliberative', and 'constitutional', with variations of so called 'party', 'representative', 'direct', 'participatory', 'procedural', 'substantive', 'referendum', and 'consolidated' democracies; or as countries that have incorporated listed types of democracy or only the elements into their political-and-legal systems, being countries of interstate or intrastate federalism, and unitary states with different historical backgrounds, economic resources, political and civic culture⁵, with written and unwritten/uncodified constitutions, or such that are hard to amend.

For example, certain experts claim that amendment culture in the case of the UK's 'customary constitution' (in the reference to New Labor's constitutional reforms) in the line of other debatable arguments is a kind of a "remarkable record of adaptation to changing circumstances and challenges"⁶. Political contexts in referendums may change from one empirical case to another.

³ See graphics – Picture 1.

⁴ See: Timeline of Constitutions. Data from the Comparative Constitutions Project. – URL: <https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/>. The data on the countries of Sub Saharan Africa were not included within present paper. (Suggested data citation: Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton. [year]. The Endurance of National Constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.)

⁵ For ex.: Almond G. and Verba S. in 1963 while studying political culture (and 'the level of involvement between individuals and political order') of Italy, Mexico, the UK, US, and West Germany, termed three 'ideal-type' political cultures: participant, parochial, subject ('participant' – US, 'alienated' – Italy, 'alienated but aspiring' – Mexico, 'political detachment and subject competence' – Germany, 'deferential civic culture' – the UK). [Almond G., Verba S. The Civic Culture. – Princeton University press, 1963; Danziger J.N. Understanding the political world: an introduction to political science – Longman, 1991]

⁶ Cited in: The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions/ Edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman. – Oxford University Press, 2006. – P. 98. [Original source: Johnson N. Reshaping the British Constitution: Essay in Political Interpretation. – Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.]

Thus, in one of referendum-focused causal studies was stated that the phenomenon was “an important decision-making device since the mid-twentieth century in very few countries”⁷. Author strived to explain “the increase in the frequency of referendums in the consolidated democracies” by two assumptions: (i) because of (a) circumstantial factors, (b) being a “part of a more structural trend, ... whereby democracies by means of referendums ... are becoming more and more direct and less and less mediated”; (ii) “the growing use of referendums” does not indicate “necessarily a positive development, given that ‘more referendums’ does not necessarily mean ‘more democracy’”, and in reality, the frequency of referendums “merely mask the use of the referendum by governments not for genuine consultative purposes,... but instead for instrumental and strategic purposes, such as the consolidation of governments’ own power”⁸. The last refers to entire control of the political agenda by its political elites in the struggle for power.

In another study, the researcher completes that, there are “considerable variations ...of government control over voting”, for instance, in the countries where the referendum could be initiated by certain political body as party-controlled government and “if voting is at the government’s discretion, they can call a referendum only when they hope to win... This gives them considerable tactical advantages as well as diminishing the efficacy of the popular vote” and those countries, where “initiatives...organized independently of government wishes, greater scope exists for excluded and new parties to achieve some policy objectives ... allows other groups and indeed spontaneous organizations of electors themselves to exert influence”⁹.

Accordingly, constitutional changes could be evaluated in terms of consecutive reforms considered necessary at certain node of political changes and outputs. These factors awake critical (scholarly) debates over the essentials of preferred development model.

It is known, that intellectual traditions in reasoning about and postulating ‘development’ and ‘change’ were dominated by Western schools and paradigms, to be precise, structural theories of development, mainly modernization,

⁷ Morel L. The Rise of Government-Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies. Chapter in ‘Referendum Democracy’ Ed. by Mendelsohn M., Parkin A. – Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. – URL: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403900968_3

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See: Budge I. Direct Democracy. Chapter 30. in ‘The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’ Edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman. – Oxford University Press, 2006. – P. 598-604.

institutionalism, dependency, and statism theories, and less by non-Western domain, spotted in discourses of globalization, North-South Dialogue, global South, World-systems, modern vs. traditional approaches, and etc.¹⁰

Accordingly, prominent American scholar S. Huntington in his book 'Political order in changing societies' explained modernization as "a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity" and revealed that "the principal aspects of modernization" – coined by Daniel Lerner – "urbanization", industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion"¹¹. He had differentiated few dimensions and levels in the process of modernization: (a) psychological level (with fundamental shifts in values, attitudes, and expectations), when traditional approach demarcates "continuity in nature and society", and modern approach "accepts the possibility of change and believes in its desirability" with "an increasing reliance on universalistic rather than particularistic values"; (b) intellectual level (awareness of and "knowledge about environment and the diffusion of this knowledge throughout society through increased literacy, mass communications, and education"; (c) economic dimension ("with diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones"); (d) political dimension (with "the rationalization of authority, the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority", "assertion of the external sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national government against local and regional powers", "the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions", "increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society"¹². For scholar one of primary pillars of social and economic change and renewal is based on the development of strong political institutions.

In the line with constructing theoretical frames to explain the process of modernization and illustrating general limitations, it was articulated to 'dichotomous nature' of the idea that "developing societies were regarded as the

¹⁰ See for ex.: Willis K. Theories and Practices of Development – Routledge, 2005; Routledge International Handbook of Sustainable development / Ed. by M. Redclift, D. Springett – Routledge, 2015; Fifty key thinkers on Development / Ed. by D.Simon – Routledge, 2019.; and etc.

¹¹ Huntington S.P. Political Order in Changing Societies. – Yale University Press, 1968. – P. 32.

¹² Ibid., P. 32-36.

antipode of socio-economic and cultural-anthropological characteristics of developed ones... The distinction between those and other societies was reduced to a number of opposite notions: ‘agrarian vs. industrial’, ‘redistributing limited material resources and regulating social needs vs. centered to unlimited growth of production and needs’, ‘authoritarian vs. liberal’, ‘hierarchical vs. egalitarian’, ‘closed vs. open’, nepotism (devotion to the primary social “cell”) vs. citizenship (loyalty to society and the state), a “dissolved” personality vs. an independent individual, conformism vs. a creative personality, and etc. [...] Between the state of “traditionalism” and “modernity” no historical space was visible ... The scheme of the ‘ideal modernization’ ultimately required a complete rupture of Third World states with/from their past, the denial of any continuity, a complete disentanglement from cultural tradition”¹³.

Economic determinism prevailed in constructing modernization models. These practices in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1950-60s had demonstrated the failure of the principles of ‘perfect’ modernization, which required to revise the chosen model of change, not skipping transition, but rather an insertion and constructive combination of the ‘new’ and ‘old’, ‘modernity’ and ‘traditionalism’, that “imply the differentiation of various elements of tradition and the possibility of partial and selective usage in the modernization strategies”¹⁴. Similar logic could be traced in revelations of an American research professor of political science in UCI J.N. Danziger, who wrote in the 1991: “In the contemporary political world, the obstacles are pervasive, and determination of the best strategy is baffling. At every turn, the underlying political choices are fundamental: freedom versus security, economic development versus welfare, political equality versus economic equality, democracy versus efficiency [...]”¹⁵. By continuing previous ideas, it could be added, that states’ options of development paradigm convene from concepts of ‘determinism vs. indeterminism’, to be precise, historical events, geographical, political (institutional), economic, cultural, scientific and technological,

¹³ See: Гордон А.В. Сэмюэл Хантингтон и его концепция политической модернизации. Предисловие к книге Хантингтон С. Политический порядок в меняющихся обществах. Перевод с английского В.Р. Рокитянского. – Москва: Прогресс-Традиция, 2004. – С.8-18. (*translated by author – NM*)

¹⁴ See: Гордон А.В. Сэмюэл Хантингтон и его концепция политической модернизации. Предисловие к книге Хантингтон С. Политический порядок в меняющихся обществах. Перевод с английского В.Р. Рокитянского. – Москва: Прогресс-Традиция, 2004. – С.8-18. (*translated by author – NM*)

¹⁵ Danziger J.N. Understanding the political world: an introduction to political science – Longman, 1991. – P.372.

intellectual resources-driven predeterminations (causes) vs. chance (randomness or probability).

In addition, in contemporary development studies it is important to assess discursive debates between coalitions of international governmental (state) and non-governmental (non-state) actors and stakeholders over (I) development policies and mechanisms, which better shape (a) cooperation vs. control or governance ‘templates’, (b) dominance vs. ‘marginalizing’ matrix, (II) national and international standards and norms (set by UN, UNCTAD, ILO, OECD, IMF, World Bank, WTO, WHO, and etc.)¹⁶.

New trends are represented also through the competing approaches in the very Western thought-led domain and between Western and non-Western knowledge-bases. Giving new insights to thinking about development, American economist, Nobel Memorial Prize laureate J.E. Stiglitz stated in 2018 that gap between developing countries and developed set not only by “disparity in resources, but a disparity in knowledge and institutions”¹⁷. The alternative approach in Western thought-led modernization (its integrated and values-based version) was set not only by the premise of rationalization of authority/power (according to M.Weber), but the premise of emancipation from it (according to C.Welzel), when modernization turns into a process of human development that contributes to the emancipation of an individual in various spheres. At the same time this emancipation reflects in setting shared values that are differentiated in quite rigid framework within the binary opposition of “traditional values vs. secular-rational values” and “survival values vs. self-expression values” (according to R. Inglehart)¹⁸. The waves/series of intellectual, technological, economic, and political development come with interdependence between structures and agent’s strategies. One of the state theory and political economy

¹⁶ See for ex.: Finnemore M., Sikkink K. *International Norms and Political Change*//International Organization 52, 1998.; citation No.10.

¹⁷ Stiglitz J.E. *From Manufacturing Led Export Growth to a 21st Century Inclusive Growth Strategy: Explaining the Demise of a Successful Growth Model and What To Do About It*. Paper presented at a conference at UNU-WIDER Think Development – Think WIDER Conference, Helsinki, Finland, September 15, 2018. (Statement by UNU-WIDER: This is a draft version of a conference paper. This is not a formal publication of UNU-WIDER and may reflect work-in-progress; Statement by Stiglitz J.E.: “Various parts of this paper are based on joint work with Martin Guzman, Bruce Greenwald, and Akbar Noman to whom I am greatly indebted. (See, in particular, Noman and Stiglitz (2012a, b, 2015a,b), Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006, 2008a,b, 2014a,b, 2015), and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014, 2015)”) – URL: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Events/PDF/Papers/Draft-paper-Juseph-Stiglitz-Sept2018.pdf> - P. 3-4.

¹⁸ See: Инглхарт Р., Вельцель К. *Модернизация, культурные изменения и демократия: Последовательность человеческого развития*. – М.: Новое издательство, 2011.

scholars (structure-and-agent approach student) British academic B. Jessop argues “how a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies . . . some actions over others, and the ways . . . in which actors . . . take account of this differential privileging through ‘strategic-context analysis’”¹⁹. Interpreting Jessop’s ‘dialectic of structures and strategies’ in the exercise of state power, British professor of political science R.A.W. Rhodes formulates that “individuals intending to realize certain objectives and outcomes make a strategic assessment of the context in which they find themselves. However, that context is not neutral. It too is strategically selective in the sense that it privileges certain strategies over others. Individuals learn from their actions and adjust their strategies. The context is changed by their actions, so individuals have to adjust to a different context. Institutions or functions no longer define the state. It is a site of strategic selectivity”²⁰.

One of the most crucial factors, that enormously impacted development itself, and at the same time, paradigmatic shifts in development theories, is globalization. Examining the ideas of an inventor of ‘counter hegemonic globalization’ with not “just one globalization but various ‘globalizations’” Portugal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos, it was drawn that in neoliberal globalization “injustices are not only social and economic but also epistemological. Imperialism leads to the disparaging of alternative knowledges and epistemologies . . . Hence, there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice”²¹. Scholars postulate, that “globalization ultimately reveals the heterogeneity of countries, entering into common interaction according to universal rules and feeds the process of their differentiation”²². The integrative processes of industrially developed countries ‘equipped’ the fundamentals for entering globalization, which had provided them with a more effective solutions of a number of economic, political and social challenges. And for developing countries, this integration represents not a natural historical

¹⁹ Cited in: Rhodes R.A.W. Old institutionalisms. Chapter 6. in ‘The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’ Edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman. – Oxford University Press, 2006. – P. 99-100 [Original citation: Jessop B. Bringing the state back in (yet again): reviews, revisions, rejections, redirections.// International Review of Sociology, 11 (2), 2001.]

²⁰ Rhodes A.W.R. Old institutionalisms. Chapter 6. in ‘The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’ Edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman. – Oxford University Press, 2006. – P. 99-100.

²¹ Coleman W.D., Sajed A. Fifty key thinkers on globalization. – Routledge, 2013. - P.198.

²² Жуков С.В., Эльянов А.Я. Развивающиеся страны: асимметрии глобализации // Восток (Oriens). – Москва, 2006. – №6. – С. 65.

process as for developed ones, and therefore is linked to ‘skimming’ approach in response to a number of challenges and risks.

The logic of historical development predetermined the delineation between the countries of the Center and the Periphery, the North and the South, developed and developing. That is to say, the IMF and the World Bank settled on the universal rules for the interaction between national economies in the global economic system. To find the consensus for the North-South dialogue these financial institutions launched the Structural Adjustment Program, best known as the Washington Consensus²³. However, at present, this policy takes into account both the variables of the market functions and the state ones, as well as the distinctiveness of a certain country, that requires an individual approach to its development, the need for which in the initial phase of liberal reforms due to structural adaptation loans of the IMF and World Bank, in fact, were ignored²⁴. Additionally to conventional wisdom of development and existing narratives, in 2016 group of 13 economists (including 4 former Chief Economists of the World Bank) put forward the Stockholm Statement of development principles²⁵. The Stockholm Statement “recognized the interdependence of countries, and that the policies of the large rich countries have large externalities on the rest of the world [...] (including their monetary,

²³ Consensus covered 10 principles.: “1. Fiscal discipline; 2. A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure; 3. Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base); 4. Interest rate liberalization; 5. A competitive exchange rate; 6. Trade liberalization; 7. Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment; 8. Privatization; 9. Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit); 10. Secure property rights” – See: Williamson J. What Should the World Bank Think about Washington Consensus? // The World Bank Research Observer. – Vol.15, No. 2, August 2000. – P. 252-253. – URL: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/624291468152712936/pdf/766500JRN0WBRO00Box374385B00PUBLIC0.pdf>

²⁴ См.: Вулфенсон Дж., Бургиньон Ф. Развитие и сокращение масштабов бедности. Оглядываясь в прошлое и заглядывая в будущее. // Всемирный банк. – 2004.; Stiglitz J.E. Globalization and Its Discontents. – London: Penguin Book, 2002; Жуков С.В., Эльянов А.Я. Развивающиеся страны: асимметрии глобализации // Восток (Oriens). – Москва, 2006. – №6. – С. 69-70.

²⁵ “1. GDP growth is not an end in itself; 2. Development has to be inclusive; 3. Environmental sustainability is a requirement, not an option; 4. The need to balance market, state, and community; 5. Successful development requires providing macroeconomic stability, but this does not just mean balancing budgets or focusing exclusively on inflation; 6. Attending to the impact of global technology and inequality. It will be especially important to assess impacts on labor, in both developed and developing countries. Successful responses require investment in human capital and creating new instruments of redistributions within and between countries; 7. Social norms and mindsets matter. One especially needs to bring the insights of modern behavioral economics to bear in development policies. These may provide effective ways of altering behavior (savings, fertility, etc.), and often at very low cost; 8. Global policies and the responsibility of the international community... to ensure that there are equitable pro-development policies” – See: Stockholm Statement. Towards a consensus on the principles of policy-making for the contemporary world – URL: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/News/Documents/Stockholm%20Statement.pdf>; Stiglitz J.E. Op.cit. – URL: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Events/PDF/Papers/Draft-paper-Juseph-Stiglitz-Sept2018.pdf> - P. 5-6.

regulatory, trade, and migration policies). Tax havens, which the regulatory policies of the advanced countries tolerate, affect all countries, not just the developing countries. [...] International agreements cover only part of these areas [...] developed countries have not lived up to their commitments of 0.7% of GDP in aid”²⁶.

The export-led policies ensured countries’ entry to the global market and characterized almost all successfully developing countries²⁷. To meet the development agenda these countries adopted diverse growth-oriented models concurrently “because they refer to different phases of economic processes (funding, production, trade), different dimensions of development (economic, social) and impinge on different endowments and resources”, as was stressed in the FAO special issue paper, in addition we could observe “the convergence or divergence in the development processes of similar countries adopting different paradigms, of different countries or similar countries adopting similar paradigms”: “i. free-market trickle-down growth-led development; ii. pro-poor (broad-based or balanced) growth-led development; iii. low-wage industry-led development; iv. low-wage labor-intensive export-led development; v. agriculture-based development; vi. endogenous growth-based development; vii. rural development paradigm; viii. Washington consensus-based development; ix. strategic openness-based development; x. exhaustible-resource export-led

²⁶ Stiglitz J.E. Op.cit. – URL: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Events/PDF/Papers/Draft-paper-Juseph-Stiglitz-Sept2018.pdf> - P. 5-6.

²⁷ For example, in this regard, the UNCTAD in the year of financial crisis in 2008 identified the following groups of developing countries: oil exporters – 22; exporters of industrial products – 12 (Brazil, Hong Kong, India, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Philippines, South Korea); the group of other countries, which were distinguished as subgroups with particularly unfavorable conditions for development: the least developed countries – 49; landlocked developing countries – 31; heavily indebted countries – 41. – See: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008. – New-York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008. P. xv-xvii.; Such classification has little changed with respect to developed economies, selected groups in developing economies: developing economies in Africa, Americas, Asia and Oceania, in statistics – developing economies excluding China and developing economies excluding LDCs; least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), small island developing states (SIDS), heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC); countries of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and G20 (Group of twenty). – See: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2022. – Geneva: UN, 2022. - P. 98. (Statement by Organization in Handbook: UNCTAD’s classification of economies into developing and developed is intended for statistical convenience and does not express judgement about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process. Thus for ex.: in section covering data on ‘International merchandise trade’ Leading exporters and importers in developing economies in 2021 are represented by developing economies in Africa (exporters and importers: South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco), Americas (exporters: Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru; importers: Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia), Asia and Oceania (exporters: China, Hong Kong SAR (China), Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, United Arab Emirates; importers: China, Hong Kong SAR (China), India, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China). – URL: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdstat47_en.pdf

development; xi. agricultural commodity export-led development; xii. emigration-based development; xiii. immigration-based development; xiv. FDI-based development; xv. foreign aid-based development”²⁸.

At the same time, general approaches to development, broadly, the intellectual paradigm, have been supplemented by more feasible development indicators within certain road maps, short, mid and long-term goals, which should have to be reached by country²⁹, i.e. the publications of World Bank as World Development Report since 1978 and World Development Indicators (first edition in 1997). A number of single-variable and multivariable approaches, various qualitative indicators were introduced to measure nations’ specific capabilities, comparative advantages and power by different groups of scholars and international institutions. For ex., the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) [data on military spending, troops, population, urban population, iron and steel production, and energy consumption] was largely employed by different experts³⁰.

It is generally accepted, that theories of development were largely based on countries’ static comparative advantages. In the quest of sufficient reply to the “source of comparative advantage” J.E. Stiglitz accentuated on qualitative features, “based characteristics, the immobile “factors”, the embedded knowledge of society, its institutions and norms, the institutional infrastructure (political system, and its stability; rule of law; systems of checks and balances),

²⁸ See: Bellù L.G. Development and development paradigms: a (reasoned) review of prevailing visions// Food and agriculture organization of the United Nations EASYPol Module 102. Issue Paper. – FAO, 2011. – URL: <https://www.fao.org/3/ap255e/ap255e.pdf>

²⁹ For ex.: Sovereign credit ratings, Women, Business and Law Index, Global Competitiveness Index, Economic Freedom Index, OECD Country Risk Classification, Logistics Performance Index, Open Budget Index, E-government Development Index, Human Development Index, Sustainable Development Goals, Global Innovation Index, Statistical Capacity Indicator, Competitive Industrial Performance Index, FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators [Political Stability and Absence of violence/terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption], Press Freedom Index, Corruption Perception Index, Rule of Law Index, World Justice Project, Democracy Index, and etc.

³⁰ As was pointed out by M. Beckley that “a review of the literature, scholars and government analysts produced at least 69 power measurement frameworks from 1936 to 2010, and 42 of these frameworks were composed solely of some combination of the gross indicators”, including “various measures of economic input (e.g., on research and development spending, capital investment, and energy consumption); economic output (e.g., GDP, manufacturing, and industrial output); trade and financial flows; and “bean counts” of military spending, platforms, and personnel. The remaining 27 formulas combined gross material indicators with nonmaterial factors (e.g., morale, prestige, and diplomatic skill), per capita material indicators, or both”. It was also delineated that “gross indicators are one-dimensional; they measure only the size of a country’s resources, not how efficiently a country uses them”. – See: Beckley M. The Power of Nations. Measuring What Matters // International Security, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Fall 2018) – URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00328 – P. 15, 17.

physical infrastructure, its reputation (“branding”), and the skills, health and discipline of work force. All of these affect ability to attract and retain talent and capital”³¹. Scholar concludes that a new multi-pronged, comprehensive development strategy “must create new dynamic comparative advantages”³².

Uzbekistan is striving to construct more ‘complex’ political system. At different phases, legal changes allow to test the political system and social cohesion for strength and trust. Current constitutional changes should call for further institutionalization of its political system with multiplying demands and support (input), broadening participation in political and economic life by creating new associations (output). In this sense, political system should correspond to current challenges and expand its “extractive, regulative, responsive, distributive and symbolic capabilities”³³.

In this regard, it is important to improve responsive competitive strategy with focus on competitive cluster advantages (increase productivity, stimulate innovations, develop new business areas) prevailing over conventional country advantages (natural and labor resources, territory and population)³⁴, considering as a source of competitive advantage, as well as geopolitical, geo-economic and political parameters and criteria for Uzbekistan’s competitiveness on the world arena.

Thus, Uzbekistan’s certain ‘performance’ indicators in international ratings and indices would make it possible not only to improve investment attractiveness and strengthen the country’s image on the international arena, but also to conduct a system analysis of country’s socio-economic and political-and-legal progress, to assess the extent of fundamental changes have been carried out in various spheres, to promote initiatives on improving the system of public authority and governance, democratizing society, implementing reforms in

³¹ See: Stiglitz J.E. From Manufacturing Led Export Growth to a 21st Century Inclusive Growth Strategy: Explaining the Demise of a Successful Growth Model and What To Do About It. Paper presented at a conference at UNU-WIDER Think Development – Think WIDER Conference, Helsinki, Finland, September 15, 2018. (Statement by UNU-WIDER: This is a draft version of a conference paper. This is not a formal publication of UNU-WIDER and may reflect work-in-progress; Statement by Stiglitz J.E.: “Various parts of this paper are based on joint work with Martin Guzman, Bruce Greenwald, and Akbar Noman to whom I am greatly indebted. (See, in particular, Noman and Stiglitz (2012a, b, 2015a,b), Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006, 2008a,b, 2014a,b, 2015), and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014, 2015)”) – URL: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Events/PDF/Papers/Draft-paper-Juseph-Stiglitz-Sept2018.pdf> - P. 28.

³² Ibid., P.31.

³³ See: Almond G.A., Powell G. B. Comparative politics: a developmental approach. – Boston, 1966.

³⁴ See: Porter M. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. – New York: The Free Press, 1998.

constructing strong civil society and strong state, based on best international practices (benchmarking)³⁵.

Improving most of indicators as more advanced or ideal in terms of “reforms aimed at guaranteeing the protection of human rights, expanding the living standards of the population, ensuring freedom of economic activity, advancing substantive and procedural norms in the judicial and legal areas”, as well as with the aim of developing national indices for self-assessment based on finest international criteria and indicators, were reflected in the articles of the ‘new’ Constitution.

The amendments being made and the expected changes secure the status of Uzbekistan as a “social/welfare” state, which is transforming/updating its development paradigm, including the construction of both a ‘strong society’ and a ‘strong state’.

The world has entered and remains in a state of a newly revived ‘bloc discipline’ and confrontation. Uzbekistan does not stand aloof from these processes, not on the periphery of sharp confrontation at global strategic level, therefore, the country preserves and maintains the principles of peaceful coexistence, continues to advance a cooperative system of relations with neighboring countries, allies, and strategic partners that is intended to provide long-term economic growth, to ensure social welfare and consecutive political development.

Thus, the Preamble of the draft of the new Constitution comprises the following tenet: “the pursuit of maintaining and developing friendly relations of Uzbekistan with the world community, primarily with neighboring states, on the basis of cooperation, mutual support, peace and harmony”³⁶.

³⁵ Указ Президента Республики Узбекистан от 02.06.2020 г. № УП-6003 «Об улучшении позиций Республики Узбекистан в международных рейтингах и индексах, а также внедрении нового механизма системной работы с ними в государственных органах и организациях» - URL: <https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4838765?ONDATE2=18.03.2022&action=compare>; Selected indices according to Decree in socio-economic sphere: Sovereign credit ratings, Women, Business and Law, Global Competitiveness Index, Economic Freedom Index, OECD Country Risk Classification, Logistics Performance Index, Open Budget Index, E-government Development Index, Human Development Index, Sustainable Development Goals, Global Innovation Index, Statistical Capacity Indicator, Competitive Industrial Performance Index, FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index; in political-and-legal sphere: Worldwide Governance Indicators [Political Stability and Absence of violence / terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption], Press Freedom Index, Corruption Perception Index, Rule of Law Index, World Justice Project, Democracy Index.

³⁶ Проект Конституционного Закона Республики Узбекистан. – URL: <https://meningkonstitutsiyam.uz/rus.pdf>

Due to geostrategic advantages Central Asia constantly remain the arena of confrontation between the “pivotal” states, both intra-regional and extra-regional powers, the clash of geopolitical and geo-economic interests that are illustrated in fluctuations from cooperation and mild competition to strong rivalry and long-term confrontation. Under these circumstances participating parties develop countermeasures articulated in more effective security mechanisms, regional cooperation formats, and vital geo-economic (infrastructure) projects.

Measuring Uzbekistan’s progress in 2016-2019, an Australian strategic analyst and historian G.R. Copley stressed that “Uzbekistan is emerging as the “strategic surprise player”, galvanizing the Silk Road and Central Asia, Uzbekistan has re-emerged as “the heartland of the heartland”, also as a significant aspect of the Indian Ocean strategic matrix”, “the former Soviet states of Central Asia have begun, on their own, to coalesce into a *bloc*. And at the heart of that *bloc* is Uzbekistan. ... It is a *bloc* which geopolitically provides a wedge of separation of Russia and the PRC, and, significantly, becomes part of the greater Indian Ocean trading basin as well as a decisive factor within Eurasia. But by creating a cohesive alliance of interdependent Central Asian states ... the bloc also contributes to the economic wellbeing of both Russia and the PRC, offsetting for both those powers the reality that the Central Asian states also serve to break up the monolithic dominance of the “world island”. ... Uzbekistan remains the geopolitical crossroads linking the region to the south and the Indian Ocean, and in the East-West Silk Road, and it remains a cultural heartland”³⁷.

With the intention to strengthen and deepen cooperation in the Central Asian region, Uzbekistan is striving to develop mutual successful partnership formats that would help overcome the fragmentation of the regional political and economic area. The institutionalization of regional interactions is being successfully carried out, i.e.: (a) consultative meetings of heads of states, that are intended to determine a common denominators on regional development and the international agenda, search for possible solutions to challenges and threats to the development of stable relations; (b) cross-border regional interactions

³⁷ Copley G.R. Uzbekistan Re-Emerges as the Strategic "Heartland of the Heartland"// Journal of International Relations (Uzbekistan), 2019, No. 3-4. – P. 17, 18-20. – URL: https://uwed.uz/uploads/files/journal_articles/82811647433478.pdf

framed by particular trans-border economic zones; maintaining cooperation in terms of (c) economic and corporate diplomacy (economic cooperation, energy and transport cooperation frameworks, joint infrastructure projects, cultural and humanitarian projects), (d) inter-parliamentary interactions, (e) education, science, technology and innovations-oriented mutual projects and etc. with broad recognition of ‘multi-track’ approach.

Uzbekistan takes active steps to promote the peace process and socio-economic development in Afghanistan, pursues a balanced policy to mitigate environmental challenges and socio-economic consequences of the drying up of the Aral Sea with the involvement of international participants, initiates and participates in the construction of transport corridors, taking into account the transit potential of the Central Asian region and implementation of infrastructure projects, etc.

Within the implementation of strategic foreign policy tasks and initiatives, as well as priorities targeted in Strategy of Actions in 2017-2021 and Development Strategy for 2022-2026 Uzbekistan jointly with a group of UN member countries developed special resolutions of the UN General Assembly: “Resolution on Strengthening Regional and International Cooperation to ensure Peace, Stability and Sustainable development in the Central Asian region”, “Resolution on Sustainable Tourism and Sustainable Development in Central Asia”, “Resolution on declaring the Aral Sea region a zone of ecological innovations and technologies”, “Resolution on strengthening connectivity between Central and South Asia”³⁸.

In this way, in terms of cross-border regional cooperation and creation borderline “development corridors” there could be observed intensive interactions between the border regions of Uzbekistan and (i) Turkmenistan, the Bukhara and Khorezm regions of Uzbekistan with the Lebap and Dashoguz velayats of Turkmenistan within a border trade zone; (ii) Tajikistan – the capacity for cross-border cooperation within specially protected natural areas between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan aimed to preserve ecosystems, landscapes, flora and fauna; (iii) Kyrgyzstan – cooperation on a unique platform – the Council of Heads of Border Regions of Kyrgyzstan

³⁸ See: https://unrcca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/a_res_72_283_r.pdf; <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/435/11/PDF/N1943511.pdf?OpenElement>; <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/123/41/PDF/N2112341.pdf?OpenElement>

and Uzbekistan; (iv) Kazakhstan – the construction of the International Center for Trade and Economic Cooperation “Central Asia” on the Uzbek-Kazakh border near the checkpoint “Gishtkuprik” (“Jibek Joly”)³⁹.

Structural changes within the system of international relations and shifts in the balance of power now and then create demand for multilateralism as a model for effective cooperation, which causes institutional adjustments, creates the set of rules and “renewed” norms, and gives suitable solutions of interaction under the new “power” structure and within certain strategic environment. Even international system corresponds mostly to state-centric model of international communication; its transformations are characterized by sporadic and complex multidimensional development that is less predictable and more uncertain. It requires novel/innovative approaches to cooperation, expressed in new multilateralism, new regionalism and new network institutionalism. Principles of multilateralism signify a balanced, mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation-led Uzbekistan’s foreign political strategy.

Today, Uzbekistan sufficiently involved into the system of interactions with and networks between a number of international organizations, i.e. the UN and its specialized agencies, OSCE, SCO, OIC, OTS, CIS, ECO, EU and NATO partnership projects, etc.

It is important to emphasize, that the year of 2020 was marked by a number of significant high-level events, that is, Uzbekistan’s interactions within multilateral institutions: Uzbekistan for the first time was elected by UN GA member-states to the UN Human Rights Council for the 2021-2023; received the status of observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), implemented a number of initiatives and announced a number of obligations during the country’s chairmanship in the Commonwealth of Independent States⁴⁰.

In 2021-2022 Uzbekistan carried out the chairmanship in SCO. It should be underlined, that interactions within SCO are of strategic magnitude to Uzbekistan.

³⁹See: <https://darakchi.uz/ru/148441>; <https://avesta.tj/2022/09/01/tadzhikistan-i-uzbekistan-obsudili-prigranichnoe-sotrudnichestvo-na-ohranyaemyh-prirodnih-territoriyah/>; <https://mfa.gov.kg/ru/dm/uzbekistan-ru/menyu---inostrannoe/novosti/novosti-i-sobytiya/o-sostoyanii-sotrudnichestva-mezhdu-kyrgyzstanom-i-uzbekistanom->

⁴⁰ See: Концепция председательства Республики Узбекистан в Содружестве Независимых Государств в 2020 году. – URL: <https://cis.minsk.by/page/19308>; Дана оценка на «отлично» председательству Узбекистана в СНГ. 19.12.2020 – URL: <https://parliament.gov.uz/ru/events/other/33128/>

Focusing on transformation of world system and in this regard on challenges to Uzbekistan's foreign policy the First Deputy Chairman of the Senate of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, UWED Rector S.Safoev and UWED professor, Director of the IAIS Sh. Abdullayev in co-authored editorial give emphasis to the SCO Samarkand summit⁴¹, which demonstrated, "that Uzbekistan confidently acquires a status of regional power"⁴².

The SCO Samarkand summit assumed to delineate Organization's development milestones and its key parameters, strategic narratives and security imperatives within SCO area in terms of new (trans) regionalism.

Conventional understanding of regionalism and institutionalism itself was reshaped by the configuration of 'new'; its specifics is reflected in construction of geo-economic areas as socio-economic and security complexes (Indo-Pacific, Trans-Pacific, Eurasian, North Atlantic, or Southern) with the congruence between participating states' strategic goals, preferences, interests and demands⁴³. Thus, for instance Shanghai Cooperation Organization with its member-nations, observers and dialogue partners comprises several geo-economic areas, includes different powers with diverse 'geopolitical codes'⁴⁴, development indicators, military potential, economic and cultural strength. It is acknowledged, that as international institutions help to promote preferences of member nations, they change both internal organizational and external environmental consequences.

UWED professor Sh. Abdullayev, shaping Uzbekistan's interests in Organization of Turkic States, characterizes the conceptual rethinking and comprehensive practical renewal of Uzbekistan's foreign policy that led to the transformation of the foreign political environment into active cooperation, prudent compromises, and the search for mutually beneficial solutions in

⁴¹ Summit held in 15-16 September 2022.

⁴² Сафоев С.С., Абдуллаев Ш. М. Трансформация мировой системы и внешнеполитические приоритеты Узбекистана// Международные отношения, № 5-6, 2022. – С.5-6.

⁴³ See: Хасанов У.А. Теория международных отношений. – Ташкент: УМЭД, 2022. – С.382.

⁴⁴ Inventors of this notion identify that "geopolitical codes operate at three levels: local, regional and global. The local-level code involves evaluation of neighboring states... Regional-level codes are required for states that aspire to project their power beyond their immediate neighbors... Potential regional powers need to map out such codes... Finally, a few states will have global policies and their governments will have appropriate worldwide geopolitical codes" – See: Flint C., Taylor P.J. Political Geography. World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality. Seventh edition. – Routledge, 2018. – P. 52. In earlier version of 'geopolitical codes', the following dimensions were included: 1. who are our current and potential allies; 2. who are our current and potential enemies; 3. how can we maintain our allies and nurture potential allies; 4. how can we counter our current enemies and emerging threats; 5. how do we justify the four calculations above to our public, and to the global community (Taylor P.J., Flint C., 2000.).

conditions of conflict. Scholar differentiates a complex and multi-layered geopolitical identity of Uzbekistan based on geographical, historical, religious and cultural components, namely: *Eurasian identity* (meaning close relations with the Russian Federation, China, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Iran); *European identity* (meaning a broader interpretation of the ‘expanded’ West, including the EU, USA, UK, Japan, South Korea, Canada); in the religious aspect, Uzbekistan is part of the Islamic world and has a highly developed *Islamic identity*; in terms of common history, linguistics and civilization Uzbekistan is part of the Turkic world, “constructing” a *Turkic identity*⁴⁵.

Under the chairmanship of Uzbekistan in the Economic Cooperation Organization the year of 2022 was declared as the “Year of Strengthening Connectivity” in the ECO area. In 2019 Uzbekistan joined Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as a full-fledged member. In November 2022, at the summit of the OTS in Samarkand, the chairmanship of the Organization passed from Turkey to Uzbekistan with defined goals in terms of Organization’s strategic action plan for next five years and “Turkic World Vision 2040”. Uzbekistan has received the status of a beneficiary of the EU Generalized System of Preferences GSP+, and dynamic efforts are underway to join the WTO. Uzbekistan strives to accomplish its “soft power” mechanisms by hosting international expositions and sporting events.

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
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Picture 1. New Constitutions



Source of the Diagram: <https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>