

FOREIGN POLICY IN PRISM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS OF UZBEKISTAN

Rustam Makhmudov,
*Associate Professor, Senior Researcher
Institute for Advanced Studies
International Studies, UWED*

Abstract: *The interests of Uzbekistan are implied in the fact that they send a kind of signal to all subjects of regional and international politics about the fundamentally peaceful nature of Uzbek foreign policy. The significance of this signal becomes clear if we analyze the most complex processes and trends that have been observed in modern world politics in recent years and that Uzbekistan is forced to take into account when building its relations with States and international organizations.*

Keywords: *Uzbekistan, Constitutional reform, foreign policy, international law, geopolitical tension, sovereign equality of states, the prohibition of the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in domestic affairs*

Introduction

The constitutional reform underway in Uzbekistan is designed to consolidate in the Basic Law the positive results that our country has achieved in recent years in various areas of socio-political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian development.

One of the areas where the new course of Uzbekistan has most clearly manifested itself is the sphere of foreign policy. Thanks to a fundamentally new model of building relations with regional and global players and international organizations based on peacefulness and respect for international law, we have succeeded in creating a positive image of the country, expanding trade and economic ties, and increasing the volume of attracted foreign investment.

Taking this into account, the main provisions of the implemented foreign policy model are proposed to be fixed in Articles 17 and 18 of the new edition of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which declare the peaceful nature of Uzbek foreign policy based on the principles of sovereign equality of States, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity of States.

These Articles also indicate that Uzbekistan follows the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and its foreign policy is aimed at the full development of bilateral and multilateral relations with States and international organizations.

It is particularly worth highlighting such a point as the consolidation in Article 18 of the provision that the Republic of Uzbekistan can enter into unions, enter into the commonwealth and other interstate entities, as well as leave them based on the highest interests of the state, the people, their welfare and security.

These articles of the Constitution are of strategic value for the long-term interests of Uzbekistan from several points of view.

Constitutional Reform as Uzbekistan's geopolitical choice

The strategic value of Articles 17 and 18 for the interests of Uzbekistan lies in the fact that they send a kind of signal to all subjects of regional and international politics about the fundamentally peaceful nature of Uzbek foreign policy. The significance of this signal becomes clear if we analyze the most complex processes and trends that have been observed in modern world politics in recent years and that Uzbekistan is forced to take into account when building its relations with States and international organizations.

It is obvious that the world is steadily moving along an upward trajectory of geopolitical tension, the axis of which is the permanently escalating relations between, on the one hand, the United States and the collective West, and, on the other, Russia and China. Moreover, the parties are teetering on the verge of direct military confrontation in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as in the situation around Taiwan. Increasingly, the media and political statements are removing the taboo on the use of tactical nuclear weapons and depleted uranium shells.

One of the key indicators of the situation with a general drop in confidence in the world is the military expenditures of leading states and military blocs. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute» (SIPRI), total global military spending in 2021 exceeded \$ 2 trillion for the first time in modern history and amounted to \$ 2.1 trillion. [1].

If the United States allocated 782 billion dollars for military needs in 2022, then in 2023 – already 857 billion, thus, the annual growth was 75 billion [2]. The total military budgets of NATO countries in 2023 should also grow to \$ 1.3 trillion.. (+13%) [3]. Not far behind is China, whose military spending is expected

to grow by 7.2% to almost 22\$ 22.5 billion in 2023. At the same time, according to Western analysts, this is the tip of the iceberg, and in reality, Chinese defense spending may be even higher [4]. In turn, Russia announced that its defense budget for 2023 will be about \$ 84 billion [5]. For comparison, in 2021, Russian defense spending was estimated at \$ 65.9 billion. [1].

Such a leading economy as Japan is also on the path of increasing military spending. Its defense budget for 2023 will grow immediately by 20% to a record \$ 6.8 trillion. yen (\$55billion), which is caused, according to the official version, by regional security problems and threats from China and North Korea [6]. India's budget for the fiscal year 2023-2024 is expected to increase by 13% to \$ 72.6 billion. [7].

The second most important indicator of the deteriorating state of trust in global politics and the security system is block thinking. The essence of block thinking is that it is based on ideological paradigms, which in turn are based on binary oppositions "friend - foe". This is a very dangerous form of thinking, which in its extreme incarnations leads to the dehumanization of those actors who are not part of the "own" space, which in the future can serve as a basis for legitimizing the use of sanctions and military force against them.

President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev pointed out the crisis of trust and problems of "block thinking" in the modern world in his article published on the eve of the Samarkand summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2022. According to him, "The modern system of international cooperation, based on universal principles and norms, is beginning to fail significantly. One of the main reasons for this is a deep crisis of confidence at the global level, which, in turn, provokes geopolitical confrontation and risks the revival of block thinking stereotypes" [8].

An analysis of the current global processes in the formation of block thinking shows that we are already dealing with the threat of the revival of its attributes that were characteristic of the Cold War era.

Another consequence of block thinking is the return of the "right of the strong" to world politics, which threatens to undermine the entire system of international law that humanity has been striving to create throughout its recent history and which is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all States, the inviolability of their borders and territorial integrity, and the non-use of force or threat of force.

It would be wrong to say that there are no objective reasons for the global crisis of trust and the resurgence of block thinking. They certainly exist, and Uzbekistan takes them into account in its foreign policy and in formulating the principles contained in Articles 17 and 18 of the new Constitution.

The essence of these reasons lies in the fact that the previous model of institutions, understood as "a set of rules, compliance procedures, moral and ethical behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing wealth", as well as a source for defining the "rules of the game" that organizations follow as players, has come to its end. This model of institutions was based on the American unipolar world, the dominance of the ideology of liberalism and liberal democracy, and the closely related model of economic globalization.

It should be noted that the institutes of unipolar globalization also played a huge role in the rise of new centers of economic, military-political, scientific, and technological influence in East, South-East and South, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Some of the developing countries, thanks to their entry into the global economy, already have a potential that allows them to approach or even surpass the developed world in several parameters.

According to World Economics, in 2022, the top three leaders in 2022 in terms of GDP PPP were two developing countries and one developed. In the first place was China (\$31.56 trillion), in second – was the United States (almost \$ 23 trillion) and in third – was India (\$15.8 trillion). Japan was fourth with a large gap (\$5.7 trillion). The top ten world leaders include developing countries such as Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, and Turkey [9]. The rise of developing countries has had a very serious impact on the structure of global commodity flows and consumer markets, the global middle class, the market for a educational services, etc.

All this is already leading to the realization that the institutions of the unipolar world can no longer meet the new global reality. They also do not meet the requirements of wealth maximization for all actors in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which lays a fundamentally new foundation for economic development based on innovation and high-tech technologies of the new generation. These include artificial intelligence, neural networks, robotics, the Internet of Things, quantum, nano-and biotechnologies, and others.

The fundamental difference between the PDR and previous industrial revolutions is that for the first time in the last 300 years, a large number of

developing countries participate in it along with the developed countries of the West. Thus, India became the largest exporter of software, the value of which reached \$ 156.7 billion in the fiscal year 2021-2022 [10]. In turn, Russia and China are still the only countries in the world with hypersonic missile technologies that even the United States does not have.

All this cannot but have a serious impact on the established balance of power in the world and, consequently, the aggravation of global competition and rivalry, since the issue of leadership in the field of high technologies is always closely linked to the growth of the country's well-being and military power.

Based on all this, it becomes clear that the growing use of various non-market instruments in the competitive struggle is observed in the global economy, trade, and the financial and banking system. Their danger lies in the fact that they threaten to destroy the entire complex of ties that were created in the era of unipolar globalization.

First of all, we can note the increasing use of politically motivated primary and secondary economic, financial, and personal sanctions, which are aimed not only at the object of sanctions itself but also at those agents of international trade and economic relations who do business with the object of sanctions. The sanctions apply to the activities of companies and individuals, their bank accounts, as well as the holdings of entire countries.

The ever-increasing number of sanctions and restrictions is creating a serious element of chaos in the global economy, affecting global supply and value chains, the energy and food markets, the financial sector, and technological and scientific exchange.

Meanwhile, the impact of sanctions wars is felt not only in the economy but also in other areas, introducing them into the space of crisis. In particular, the increasing number of sanctions introduced undermines the foundations of the "free market" concept, which has been used to include the world's countries in modern globalization for at least the last three decades after the collapse of the bipolar world.

Crisis the concepts of the "free market" as a whole threaten the theoretical language of globalization, which is a synthesis of meta-narratives and discourses of liberalism, democracy, linear development of societies, and the end of history, which is used by adherents of globalization in the developed and developing

world, and which became dominant after the defeat of the "Red Project" in the world ideological struggle» with its language apparatus based on Marxism.

The crisis of the language of unipolar globalization, in turn, becomes a signal for the activation of other competing ideological concepts that seek to break the dominance of the liberal-democratic meta-narrative. At the same time, this struggle for leadership already has both a political and a power dimension.

Global political and economic processes of a pre-crisis and crisis nature are also superimposed on a general increase in the level of "conflict-prone" in the world, understood as a combination of various types of tension at the level of relations between civilizations, and states, within societies and in interpersonal relations.

Tensions are beginning to rise again in many previously frozen ethnic, religious, and border conflicts. We see a periodic escalation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, on the border of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, in hot spots in the Middle East and Africa, and in Europe, where several regions, such as Catalonia, are trying to implement their intentions to achieve state independence.

At the same time, there is an increase in contradictions in the field of values, intergenerational and gender relations. Moreover, the gaps and cracks in these segments no longer run along the borders of civilization, but inside the civilizational spaces themselves. On the one hand, we are witnessing how the younger generation, mainly representatives of the urban middle class, are striving to become part of the global process of transition to a new type of society, let's call it a "digital postmodern" society, in which living in a mode of constantly generating risks and responding to them becomes an everyday living environment. This is a "risk society", which the author of this concept, German sociologist Ulrich Beck, described as a society where the past loses its deterministic power for the present and in its place comes a "non-existent" future, the product of which is risks [11]. The "digital postmodern" society is a multicultural society that accepts the phenomenon of "gender diversity" calmly.

On the other hand, we see the opposite trend of strengthening post-secular views and ideas. This trend also introduces new negative attitudes in societies, according to which the relationship between religious and secular consciousness is no longer considered a "zero-sum game". Religious communities are recognized, as the Russian researcher Olga Bogatova notes, analyzing the views

of Jurgen Habermas on the issue of post-secularism, the right to the predicate of "rational" ones, provided that they refuse to forcibly introduce the truths of their faith. They also have the right to "articulate their position on social issues, take actions to implement it in a pluralistic society and a situation of ongoing secularization" [12]. At the same time, the question of the real readiness of all religious communities to accept the "situation of ongoing secularization" remains open.

The rapid transition of societies to a new stage of digital technologization provokes a widening gap between generations. Socialization and professionalization of the younger generation, which takes place in the space of mixing familiar and virtual reality with a permanent rapid change of gadgets, an increase in the speed of communication, and the appearance of new ideas, communication language, and smart living environment that accompany them, already leads to its "alienation" from the older generation. This violates the generational relationship that is common in traditional societies, where older generations were carriers and transmitters of knowledge for the young [13].

Starting from civilizations, cultures, and countries, and ending with individuals, we are faced with an increasing phenomenon of a decrease in the level of ontological security and even a transition to ontological insecurity [14].

In these complex conditions of a growing multidimensional crisis, each subject of international relations and the world as a whole face two options for further development of events: either continue to escalate contradictions and plunge into a long period of instability and distrust, or listen to reason and try to jointly develop new rules of the game based on respect for the principles and norms of international law.

Uzbekistan, by submitting Articles 17 and 18 of the new Constitution for public discussion and referendum, in this case, makes an unequivocal choice in favor of respect for the principles of international law and peaceful discussion of ways to resolve existing contradictions and conflicts based on them. This seems to be a rational and far-sighted approach, in any case, a new model for managing world processes with the participation of developed and developing countries, and global and regional powers will sooner or later have to be developed. It is better to start doing this now peacefully and constructively, rather than go through a period of destabilization and conflicts, huge economic and human losses, and eventually come to negotiations anyway.

The Constitution establishes the results of the policy of the period of reforms and openness of Uzbekistan

Speaking about amendments to Articles 17 and 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan related to foreign policy, it should be noted that they did not appear by chance, but are the result of understanding the model of foreign policy that was developed after the start of the policy of reforms and openness in 2016, as well as its resultsee. embodiments of positive achievements. In our opinion, four major concepts can be noted in this foreign policy model: the concepts of economization, peacefulness based on the assertion of the primacy and universality of international law, as well as the concepts of openness and constructive sovereignty.

The concept of "economization" of foreign policy itself emerged due to the change in 2016 in the strategic vision for the role and place of foreign policy in the overall structure of socio-political and economic reforms of Uzbekistan since 2016. If before the reforms, the concept of "maximizing security" was a priority in Uzbek politics, which was determined by the specifics of the regional and global situation in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, then after the reforms were launched, security issues began to play a supporting role in addressing issues of economic and technological development of the country. This, in turn, predetermined the refocusing of Uzbekistan's foreign policy guidelines on creating favorable external conditions for ensuring economic growth and development.

The adoption of the concept of "economization" of foreign policy led to an understanding of the methods of its implementation, which led to the approval of two more concepts-peace-loving foreign policy and openness, which, as international experience shows, for example, the European Union or relations between the United States and Canada in modern history, are the most effective tool for building economic relations with countries that are part of a single cultural, civilizational, and value space.

In turn, the concept of "constructive sovereignty" shows itself most effectively in relations with major powers leading trans-regional and global policies. This concept implies open and mutually beneficial cooperation with all regional and global actors of world politics, taking into account the observance of the sovereignty of Uzbekistan as the highest value and its respect by external actors. It also implies that Uzbekistan does not build relations on the model of

"those who are not with us are against us", does not participate in international actions like cancel culture, and does not build ideological walls.

In practical politics, *the combination of the concepts of economization, peacefulness, and openness* has proved effective in Uzbekistan's new course toward Central Asia.

As you know, until 2016, Uzbekistan's relations with some Central Asian countries could be described as complex, which was caused by several problems in bilateral relations, such as a discrepancy in positions on water issues that are sensitive to security and unresolved border issues. As a result, the region began to experience an unstable situation with stability and security, which in turn negatively affected the internal security of each of the Central Asian countries to varying degrees. This also led to a trend towards isolationism, which in turn triggered the geopolitical, transport, energy, cultural, and humanitarian fragmentation of Central Asia, which, generated numerous costs for the region's countries, businesses, and ordinary people.

These negative processes have been reversed only since the second half of 2016 when Uzbekistan launched a policy of reform and openness based on the principles of peace and good neighborliness. Almost immediately, a fundamental breakthrough was achieved in relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which led to a rapid improvement in the overall regional security situation, from which all Central Asian countries benefited. Here are some of the indicators of a dramatic improvement in the situation in the region.

As the first indicator, we can note the growth of bilateral trade turnover between Uzbekistan and its neighbors in the region. If at the end of 2017, the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan amounted to \$ 2 billion, then in 2022 – more than \$ 4.6 billion [15, 16]. At the same time, the parties set a goal to increase the trade turnover to \$ 10 billion in the coming years.

The impressive growth was recorded in Uzbekistan's trade with Kyrgyzstan. In the period from 2017 to 2022, it increased from \$ 253.7 million to \$ 1.26 billion, i.e. fivefold [11-7]. Commodity turnover with Turkmenistan increased even more - from \$ 177.9 million in 2017 to \$ 926.3 million in 2022. [16] Uzbek-Tajik trade increased from \$ 237.9 million in 2017 to \$ 674.4 million in 2022. [16]

Thus, in just five years, Uzbekistan's total trade volumes with Central Asian countries increased from \$ 2.6 billion in 2017 to almost \$ 7.5 billion in 2022,

which put the Central Asian region in third place among Uzbekistan's largest economic partners after Russia and China. There is no doubt that the growth of mutual interest in the economic sphere has begun to strengthen ties within the region. As a result, compared to the previous era, the Central Asian region has taken priority positions in foreign policy not only for Uzbekistan but also for its partners.

The second indicator of the changed state of the political and economic climate in the region and the growing level of trust is cooperation in the water and energy sector. A landmark event here can be considered the signing in January 2023 by the Energy Ministers of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan of the "road map" for the joint implementation of the Kambarata HPP-1 construction project on the Naryn River (Kyrgyzstan). The planned capacity of the HPP is 1,860 MW, with an annual production of 5.6 billion kWh of electricity [11-8]. It was almost impossible to imagine such a thing before the implementation of the policy of openness.

The third indicator is the growth of cooperation between Uzbekistan and Central Asian countries in the creation of new transport corridors of international importance. As an example, we can cite the intensification of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan on the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which will reduce the delivery of goods from China to Turkey by 900 km and 8 days [19]. It is expected that this road will create new points of economic growth in the territories of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan through which it will pass, which will serve as an additional catalyst for strengthening trade, economic and industrial ties within Central Asia.

The fourth indicator is the growth of tourist flows to Uzbekistan from Central Asian states, which was largely facilitated by the abolition of the visa regime and the extension of the period of stay of citizens in the territory of neighboring states. According to available statistics, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan firmly hold the lead in terms of the number of tourists visiting Uzbekistan. In 2022, more than 1.5 million Kazakh citizens, 1.44 million Tajik citizens, and 1.35 million Kyrgyz citizens arrived in Uzbekistan for tourist purposes. These three countries accounted for 4.3 million of the 5.2 million tourists who visited Uzbekistan [20].

Finally, the fifth indicator is the launch of such a multilateral regional platform as the "Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia",

which has become a symbol of the rapid growth of trust in the region. This format was initiated by the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This initiative was supported by all the leaders of the region's countries. The first Consultative Meeting was held on March 15, 2018, in Astana (Kazakhstan). In the period from 2018 to 2022, three more consultative meetings were held in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Avaza (Turkmenistan), and Cholpon-Ata (Kyrgyzstan). The fifth meeting is expected to be held in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2023.

Within the framework of this platform, the Presidents of all five Central Asian states today discuss development issues, problems, and challenges relevant to the region, as well as ways to jointly address them. The countries of the region are already starting to develop multilateral cooperation programs based on their regional interests, which is the formation of a qualitatively new situation in the region. This is confirmed by the "Road Map for the Development of regional cooperation for 2022-2024" and the Central Asian Regional Program "Green Agenda" adopted at the meeting in Cholpon-Ata.

The effectiveness of Uzbekistan's combination of the principles of economization, peacefulness, and openness also shows the volume of attracted foreign direct investment (FDI). Reducing political risks in bilateral relations with Central Asian countries and the region as a whole was one of the factors that allowed Uzbekistan to attract \$ 31 billion of FDI to the national economy in the last five years within the framework of industry programs, thanks to which the volume of industrial production was increased 1.4 times, and exports – 1.5 times [21].

The effective integration of the concepts of economization, peacefulness, and openness is also evident in Uzbekistan's policy towards Afghanistan. Despite the change of power in this country in August 2021 and the return of the Taliban movement to rule Afghanistan, Uzbekistan has maintained its policy of building a traditionally constructive and peaceful policy with the new authorities.

The main aspects of this policy were outlined in Shavkat Mirziyoyev's address to the participants of the international conference "Afghanistan: Security and Economic Development" held in Tashkent on July 26, 2022. They include the following provisions:

- the Uzbek and Afghan peoples share common cultural, spiritual, and historical values, as well as a common religion and ancestral heritage;

- the security of Central Asia and Afghanistan is indivisible because, without stability south of the Amu Darya, it will be impossible to achieve the security and sustainable development of Uzbekistan and the whole of Central Asia [22].

The productivity of the peace-loving approach is shown by the data of the Uzbek-Afghan trade, which in 2022 amounted to \$ 759.9 million, which is only slightly less than in 2020 when the new government of Ashraf Ghani was in power (\$779.1 million) [16]. It is also worth noting the resumption of cooperation and consultations between the parties around such major infrastructure projects as the Termez - Mazar-i - Sharif - Kabul - Peshawar railway and the Surkhan-Puli-Khumri power line.

A new dimension of Uzbek-Afghan cooperation was the launch of transit cargo transportation between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan. In November 2021, the first transit cargo from Uzbekistan was delivered to Pakistan, and in March 2022, the first batch of Pakistani meat was delivered to the Uzbek market through Afghan territory. India also tested this route by sending transit cargo to Uzbekistan via Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The opening of the Afghan transit corridor gave a serious impetus to the development and implementation of plans to increase trade and economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and Pakistan. It can be noted that an agreement on preferential trade has been reached, according to which duties on several dozen goods will be reduced from 20 to 100% [24]. This gave the parties reason to hope for an increase in the volume of bilateral trade from \$ 181 million in 2021 to \$ 1 billion in the foreseeable future [25].

By *combining the concepts of economization and constructive sovereignty*, it has shown its effectiveness in relations with such leading world powers as China, Russia, and the United States. These countries are now in direct competition for leadership in the new world order. Combining these concepts allows Uzbekistan to build open, constructive, and mutually beneficial relations with them from the position of prioritizing its sovereignty and its respect for partners.

This is evident in the economic sphere. Thus, Russia and China ranked first and second in the list of leading trade partners of Uzbekistan in 2022 with indicators of almost \$ 9.3 billion and \$ 8.92 billion, respectively. Trade with the United States is also showing rapid recovery from the crisis caused COVID by

the COVID-19 pandemic. If in 2020 it fell to \$ 277 million, then in 2021 it increased to \$ 426.3 million, and in 2022 – \$ 436.8 million. [16]

Constructive relations are also developing with these countries within the framework of such formats as the UN, SCO, C5+1, and the CIS, where issues of regional stability and security, economic cooperation, technological development, solving environmental and climate problems, and promoting alternative energy and green values are discussed.

By and large, such a policy of constructive sovereignty can serve as a model of foreign policy for regional states in the period of ongoing global transformations. This model works to strengthen the system of international relations and return to it the principles and norms of international law, as opposed to block thinking and the policy of playing on contradictions, which provokes instability and distrust.

Conclusion

In general, the constitutional reform, which should consolidate, on the one hand, Uzbekistan's respect for and consistent compliance with the principles and norms of international law in its foreign policy, and, on the other, fix the concepts and results of the new foreign policy model implemented after 2016, is an important step towards the evolution of the Uzbek foreign policy strategy in the context of the growing global crisis.

In this regard, Articles 17 and 18, explicitly indicate that Uzbekistan chooses the path of a peaceful foreign policy based on the principles of sovereign equality of States and respect for their territorial integrity, non-use of force or threat of force, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference-in the internal affairs of other countries, are a kind of signal to the world community Uzbekistan's choice of clear and understandable rules of the game, as opposed to the uncertainty that comes with the application of the law of the strong and based on the contradictions of States.

References

1. Timur Batyrov. Global military spending exceeds \$2 trillion a year for the first time // Forbes.ru.ru, April 25, 2022. // <https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/463775-mirovye-voennye-rashody-vpervye-prevysili-2-trln-v-god>

2. B Bloomberg learned about plans to reduce military spending by \$75 billion // RBC.ru.ru, January 1, 2023. // <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/07/01/2023/63b8cedb9a79478a7241608d>
3. Alexander Sokolov, Alexey Nikolsky. NATO countries ' military spending will grow by 13% in 2023 and will approach \$1.3 trillion. Vedomosti.ru, December 22, 2022. // <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2022/12/22/956459-voennie-rashodi-stran-nato-virastut>
4. What Does China Spend on its Military? // Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 28, 2022. // [https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-china-really-spend-its-military#:~:text=In%20March%202023%2C%20China%20announced,1.45%20trillion%20\(%24229.6%20billion\).&text=This%20continues%20a%20recent%20trend,in%20the%20upper%20single%20digits](https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-china-really-spend-its-military#:~:text=In%20March%202023%2C%20China%20announced,1.45%20trillion%20(%24229.6%20billion).&text=This%20continues%20a%20recent%20trend,in%20the%20upper%20single%20digits)
5. Russia Reportedly Raises \$13 Billion for 2023 Defense Spending // VOANews, November 19, 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-raises-13-billion-for-2023-defense-spending/6841435.html>
6. Japan unveils record defense budget amid regional security fears // AlJazeera, December 23, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/23/japan-unveils-record-defence-budget-amid-regional-security-fears#:~:text=Japan%20will%20boost%20its%20defence,by%20China%20and%20North%20Korea>
7. India raises defense budget to \$72.6 bln amid tensions with China by Manoj Kumar // Reuters, February 1, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-raises-defence-budget-726-bln-amid-tensions-with-china-2023-02-01/>
8. The SCO Samarkand Summit: Dialogue and Cooperation in an Interconnected World. Prezident.uz, 12.09.2022. <https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/5495://president.uz/ru/lists/view/5495>
9. Economies by GDP Size // World Economics, 2022. <https://www.worldeconomics.com/Rankings/Economies-By-Size.aspx>
10. Exports of software services from India increased to 88.8% during the 2021-22 fiscal: RBI // The Economic Times, September 9, 2022. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/exports-of-software-services-from-india-increased-to-88-8-during-2021-22-fiscal-rbi/articleshow/94101979.cms?from=mdr>
11. Beck W. What is globalization? - Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya, 2001.
12. O. A. Bogatova. Sotsiologicheskaya kontseptsiya postsekulyarnogo obshchestva I ee Kritik [The sociological concept of postpostsekyarnogo-secular society and its critics]. 2018. № 1. <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/sotsiologicheskaya-kontseptsiya-postsekulyarnogo-obschestva-i-ee-kritiki.pdf>
13. Khashchenko T. G., Zhitchenko O. N. Intergenerational gap in digital space: Aktual'nye vyzovy v sisteme professional'noy obrazovaniya [Actual challenges in the system of professional education]. <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/mezhpokolencheskiy-razryv-v-tsifrovom-prostranstve-aktualnye-vyzovy-v-sisteme-professionalnogo-obrazovaniya.pdf>
14. A. V. Khudaikulova, N. Ya. Neklyudov. Kontseptsiya ontologicheskoi bezopasnosti v mezhdunarodno-politicheskom diskurse [The concept of ontological security in International political discourse]. 2019. 12(6). pp.129-149 DOI 10.24833 / 2071-8160-2019-6-69-129-149. https://mgimo.ru/upload/iblock/c4e/TOB%20TOB%20in%20inter-political%20discourse_FINAL_ФИНАЛ.pdf

15. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan agreed to increase commodity turnover to \$5 billion by 2020 // Uzreport. uz, March 15, 2018. <https://www.uzreport.news/economy/uzbekistan-i-kazakhstan-dogovorilis-uvelichit-tovarooborot-do-5-mlrd-k-2020-godu>
16. Rapprochement with Russia, China is the main supplier. How Uzbekistan's foreign trade has changed in 2022 // Gazeta.uz, January 24, 2023. <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2023/01/24/trade-partners/>
17. Uzbekistan has a self-sufficient industry that is of interest to the Kyrgyz economy // CERR, February 6, 2023. <https://www.cer.uz/ru/news/news/uzbekistan-obladaet-samodostatocnoj-industrijej-kotora-predstavlaet-interes-dla-ekonomiki-kyrgyzstana>
18. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan signed a road map for Kambarata HPP-1 // Gazeta.uz, January 7, 2023. <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2023/01/07/ges/>
19. Joanna Lillis. China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan sign historic railway construction agreement // Eurasinet.org, September 15, 2022. <https://russian.eurasianet.org/китай-кыргызстан-и-узбекистан-подписали-исторический-договор-о-прокладке-железнодороги>
20. How many tourists visited Uzbekistan in 2022? // Кун.уз, 17 января 2023. <https://kun.uz/ru/news/2023/01/17/skolko-turistov-posetilo-uzbekistan-v-2022-godu>
21. Uzbekistan has attracted \$31 billion in foreign investment, and another \$70 billion is needed.уз, 28 февраля 2023. <https://nuz.uz/ekonomika-i-finansy/1269650-uzbekistan-privlek-31-mlrd-inostrannyh-investicij-trebuetsya-eshhe-70-mlrd.html>
22. International Conference " Afghanistan: Security and Economic Development "(Tashkent, July 26, 2022): address of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the participants; final Statement of the host country // CIS Integration Space Internet portal, July 27, 2022. <https://e-cis.info/news/568/102089/>
23. Uzbekistan and Pakistan agreed to increase trade turnover to \$1 billion // Spot. uz, December 27, 2022. <https://www.spot.uz/ru/2022/12/27/pakistan-trade/>
24. Shahbaz Rana. Pakistan, Uzbekistan to sign PTA // The Express Tribune, March 03, 2022. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2346175/pakistan-uzbekistan-to-sign-pta>
25. Muhammet Nazım Taşcı, Abdulrahman Yusupov. Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement to expand investment and increase trade // Anadolu Agency, December 27, 2022. <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/экономика/пакистан-и-узбекистан-подписали-соглашение-о-расширении-инвестиций-и-увеличения-торговли/2773335>